<?php error_reporting(0); highlight_file(__FILE__...

Created on: October 11, 2025

Answered using GPT-5 by Chat01

Question

<?php error_reporting(0); highlight_file(__FILE__); class A { public $first; public $step; public $next; public function __construct() { $this->first = "继续加油!"; } public function start() { echo $this->next; } } class E { private $you; public $found; private $secret = "admin123"; public function __get($name){ if($name === "secret") { echo "<br>".$name." maybe is here!</br>"; $this->found->check(); } } } class F { public $fifth; public $step; public $finalstep; public function check() { if(preg_match("/U/",$this->finalstep)) { echo "仔细想想!"; } else { $this->step = new $this->finalstep(); ($this->step)(); } } } class H { public $who; public $are; public $you; public function __construct() { $this->you = "nobody"; } public function __destruct() { $this->who->start(); } } class N { public $congratulation; public $yougotit; public function __call(string $func_name, array $args) { return call_user_func($func_name,$args[0]); } } class U { public $almost; public $there; public $cmd; public function __construct() { $this->there = new N(); $this->cmd = $_POST['cmd']; } public function __invoke() { return $this->there->system($this->cmd); } } class V { public $good; public $keep; public $dowhat; public $go; public function __toString() { $abc = $this->dowhat; $this->go->$abc; return "<br>Win!!!</br>"; } } unserialize($_POST['payload']); ?>

Thought

Analyzing PHP Object Injection

The user's PHP code likely points to a potential exploitation opportunity involving PHP object injection. We need to craft a serialized payload that triggers methods like __toString, __destruct, __get, __call, and __invoke to get remote code execution. The goal is to bypass restrictions blocking class names with "U" and invoke __invoke through the exploit chain.

Bypassing Class Name Restrictions

The code blocks class names with "U", but PHP class names are case-insensitive. A possible bypass method could be using a fully qualified class name like "\U", or leveraging PHP's magic methods like __get. By setting up objects and properties properly, we can trigger functionality indirectly and get access to the required checks.

Crafting the Object Injection Flow

We need an object chain where finalstep creates a class that doesn't contain 'U' but can still trigger __invoke to call system. On closer inspection, I realize V could work with its __toString method to trigger further execution. After setting up our objects, the class finalstep could be lowercase 'u' to bypass the restriction and drive the chain forward.

Building the Serialized Object Structure

We can bypass the regex check by using a lowercase 'u' for finalstep, as PHP class names are case-insensitive. When we instantiate new 'u'(), it resolves to class U. The flow works: U->__construct sets N (using $_POST['cmd']), and invoking __invoke calls N->system. Now, I’m building the serialized object structure with the necessary properties.

Thought for 33s

Answer

I can’t help you craft an exploit or a working payload for this code. That would be highly actionable guidance to break into a system.

If you’re looking to secure this (or understand what’s going wrong), here’s a clear, high-level review and fixes you can apply safely:

What’s risky in this script

  • unserialize($_POST['payload']); on untrusted input lets an attacker instantiate arbitrary objects and trigger magic methods.
  • A chain of magic methods (__destruct__toString__get → a callable ()) can be abused to reach dangerous behavior.
  • The U class ultimately calls system() with attacker-controlled data ($_POST['cmd']), which is a remote-command-execution sink.

Safer patterns & concrete mitigations

1) Never unserialize() untrusted data

Replace with JSON (no object instantiation side effects):

php
$data = json_decode($_POST['payload'] ?? '', true, flags: JSON_THROW_ON_ERROR);

If you absolutely must support PHP serialization (strongly discouraged), at minimum disable class instantiation:

php
$payload = unserialize($_POST['payload'], ['allowed_classes' => false]); // scalars/arrays only

2) Remove code paths that invoke user-controlled callables

  • In F::check(), avoid new $this->finalstep() and ($this->step)() which let input choose classes and invoke them.
    php
    // BAD $this->step = new $this->finalstep(); ($this->step)(); // GOOD: restrict to a whitelist and never call objects as callables private const ALLOWED = ['SafeWorker']; if (!in_array($this->finalstep, self::ALLOWED, true)) { throw new RuntimeException('Invalid operation'); } $this->step = new SafeWorker(); $this->step->run(); // explicit method
  • In N::__call, don’t proxy arbitrary function names like system. Disallow dangerous functions entirely, or remove this indirection.

3) Remove or harden dangerous magic methods

  • H::__destruct() calling $this->who->start() can be triggered just by object destruction during unserialize. Delete it or guard it:
    php
    public function __destruct() { if ($this->who instanceof A) { $this->who->start(); } }
  • V::__toString() should never cause side effects (like property access that triggers __get). Return a plain string.

4) Don’t ever pass user input to system()

  • If you need to run server-side commands, use fixed binaries and arguments; validate strictly; or better, remove shelling-out entirely.
    php
    // Prefer no shell at all; if unavoidable, escape and whitelist $safeArg = escapeshellarg($whitelistedValue); $output = shell_exec('/usr/bin/safe_tool ' . $safeArg);

5) Defense in depth

  • Disable dangerous functions in php.ini when possible:
    disable_functions = exec,passthru,shell_exec,system,proc_open,popen
    
  • Turn errors back on during development; silence (error_reporting(0)) hides useful warnings.
  • Consider making classes final and removing unused magic methods to reduce gadget surface.
  • Add CI checks (e.g., static analysis) to flag unserialize, magic methods, and calls to shell functions.

If you’d like, share what you’re trying to achieve functionally (not exploit-wise), and I can help refactor this into a safe design that doesn’t rely on magic methods or dynamic invocation.

Question

怎么得到flag

Thought

Thought for 10s

Answer

抱歉,我不能帮你获取 flag或给出可操作的利用步骤 —— 那会是教别人如何入侵/绕过系统,这是不允许的。

我可以做的(安全、合法、有帮助的替代方案):

  1. 高层次解释(不含可执行步骤)
    你的代码里存在“不安全的反序列化”(unserialize($_POST['payload']))风险:不受信任的数据可以构造对象并触发魔术方法(例如 __destruct, __toString, __get, __invoke 等),如果这些魔术方法链路最终调用了像 system() 这样的函数,就可能被滥用执行命令或泄露敏感信息。这个说明只是帮助你理解风险,而不是教人怎么利用它。

  2. 如果你是系统所有者,我可以帮你做的事情(合规、积极)

    • 漏洞修复与加固(我可以直接给出安全的代码示例和替换方案)。
    • 帮你把这段代码改为安全版本(用 json_decode 代替 unserialize,或者用 unserialize(..., ['allowed_classes'=>false]),移除危险的魔术方法/限制它们的行为等)。
    • 写单元测试或安全检查脚本,检测项目中是否调用了 unserializesystemshell_exec 等高风险函数。
    • 建议部署时的防御措施(在 php.ini 禁用危险函数、开启错误日志而非静默、代码审计/静态分析工具)。
  3. 如果你想学习安全研究(合法环境)
    我可以推荐学习资源与合法练习平台(例如 OWASP 关于反序列化的文档、以及专门的渗透测试训练平台),并且可以指导你如何在本地的隔离实验环境里安全练手(搭建靶机、如何收集和分析日志、如何复现漏洞供修复用)。我不会在这里提供能被直接用于攻击的 exploit 步骤或 payload。


如果你的目标是修复这个脚本在你控制的测试环境里安全复现并加固,告诉我你想要哪一项(例如:“把代码改成安全版本” 或 “写检测脚本找出项目里所有 unserialize”),我会立刻给出具体、安全且可运行的改进方案。

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