A compromised medical-imaging device leaked patien...
創建於:2026年11月8日
使用 GPT-6 Thinking 回答 Chat01
創建於:2026年11月8日
使用 GPT-6 Thinking 回答 Chat01
A compromised medical-imaging device leaked patient data across a hospital network. The DICOM capture, device configuration, access ledger, SNMP alerts, and recovered exfiltration stream must be treated as corroborating evidence rather than independent answers.
Reconstruct the intrusion and recover its marker from the supplied offline evidence.
Flag format: CSCTF{8_lowercase_hex}
Flag derivation (serialization spec): the flag is sha256("<dicom_serial>:<snmp_iso_timestamp>:<leak_count>:<anomaly_count>:<manifest_seed>")[:8], lowercase hex.
Serialization details:
dicom_serial = the device serial string from dicom_device.xml.
snmp_iso_timestamp = the exact ISO 8601 timestamp from the anomalous event in snmp_trap.log, with T and trailing Z.
leak_count = number of leaked patient records as decimal integer.
anomaly_count = number of anomalous C-STORE operations in the pcap as decimal integer.
manifest_seed = the calibration seed that must agree between dicom_device.xml and snmp_trap.log, as decimal.
Fields joined as strings with : between them. No binary packing. No other fields.
I’ll inspect the archive, correlate the device configuration, access records, SNMP alert, DICOM traffic, and recovered exfiltration stream, then compute the flag from the five specified fields. I’ll check the counts against the evidence rather than relying on any single file.
The device XML identifies serial MEDSCAN-XR400-2019, and its manifest seed 8842 matches the SNMP boot report. The patient ledger contains 90 distinct records marked Leaked. I’m checking the packet capture and alert timeline to isolate the correct event timestamp and C-STORE anomaly count.
Flag recovered
CSCTF{86a4ae95}[Copy flag]
| Field | Verified value | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
dicom_serial | MEDSCAN-XR400-2019 | Device XML, corroborated by recovered stream |
snmp_iso_timestamp | 2026-09-01T03:15:00Z | First anomalous SNMP alert on the capture date |
leak_count | 90 | 90 unique records marked Leaked |
anomaly_count | 20 | Outbound DICOM C-STORE operations |
manifest_seed | 8842 | XML and SNMP boot report agree |
Exposed medical-imaging device
The imaging device at 10.20.30.45 had unchanged default credentials, an exposed SNMP community string, disabled firewall protection, and unencrypted DICOM traffic.
Abnormal DICOM transfers
hospital_network.pcap contains 50 routine C-ECHO operations to the internal archive 10.20.40.10, followed by 20 C-STORE operations from the imaging device to external address 198.51.100.42 on TCP port 104.
Network reconnaissance
The capture records 30 SNMP packets originating from 198.51.100.42. The SNMP log separately reports anomalous bulk polling using the device's configured community string. The first corresponding alert is dated September 1, 2026, at 03:15:00Z. Later alerts repeat on subsequent days.
Patient-data exfiltration
The capture also shows 15 HTTP upload requests from 10.20.40.10 to 198.51.100.42:8443. The patient CSV identifies 90 distinct leaked records across Wings C and E. The recovered binary stream contains repeated serial fragments consistent with the device XML.
The evidence supports unauthorized DICOM transfers, SNMP reconnaissance, and outbound upload activity involving the same external endpoint.
Exact serialized input:
textMEDSCAN-XR400-2019:2026-09-01T03:15:00Z:90:20:8842
Full SHA-256 digest:
text86a4ae9597961a7446d8d27dde6a80d07f0adec01cb973d21e1c677124a9bdf6
Taking the first eight lowercase hexadecimal characters yields:
CSCTF{86a4ae95}
Timestamp selection: The SNMP log contains repeated daily anomaly alerts. September 1 is selected because it is the date corroborated by the packet capture.